



One particular area for green tax reform has been
the use of the tax system to provide proper incen-
tives to reduce climate change emissions, in partic-
ular carbon-dioxide (CO2). Indeed, the burning of
fossil-fuel-based energy products contributes sig-
nificantly to climate-change-related emissions.
Therefore also the European Commission commis-
sioned a new Directive (see COM(2003) 96 final)
for raising and harmonizing energy taxes across
the European Union (EU). In fact, this EU
Directive is the culmination of a long-lasting effort
to introduce a broader (implicit) tax on the use of
fossil fuels and its associated climate change emis-
sions (Ekins and Speck 1999).
Interestingly, the Netherlands, like the Scandinavi-
an countries and Austria, introduced similar ener-
gy taxes long ago. This led to an energy tax struc-
ture that is in line with the recent EU Directive on
energy taxes and therefore did not require any
serious reform when the Directive became effec-
tive at the beginning of 2004.This suggests that the
Dutch experience with energy taxation could be
seen as a prototype model for other countries to
follow when implementing the EU Directive. Up
to some point this is certainly true. It is interesting
to see what experience a small, open as well as
energy-intensive economy like the Netherlands has
had with energy taxation.
As usual, however, the devil is in the details, and
several caveats lurk around the corner. One seri-
ous caveat is that at some point revenue consider-
ations start to dominate energy tax design. This
might lead to suboptimal tax structures from both
a revenue raising as well as a corrective tax per-
spective. Some recent reforms in the Netherlands 
– although in line with the EU Directive – are a
case in point as this article will illustrate. In fact,
the recent EU Directive provides interesting
opportunities to exploit international coordination
to avoid at least some of these drawbacks provided
that the focus is on regulation,not on revenue rais-
ing energy taxes.
Energy taxation in the Netherlands
In the last two decades, several tax policy initia-
tives have caused a major shift in the way in which
energy products were treated in the Netherlands.
Taxation as a means of creating direct incentives to
reduce the climate change impacts of energy prod-
ucts has already had a long history, albeit its rev-
enue-raising impact has always been modest.
Clearly,taxes on energy use other than motor fuels,
e.g. for heating or power generation, have always
had a very limited role in the overall tax and excise
structure from a revenue perspective. As in most
European countries today, excises on mineral oils
(MOE) were also the only relevant energy taxes
before the introduction of an explicit tax on ener-
gy use in the Netherlands, the so-called Fuel Tax
(FT) implemented in 1988. Still, together both
taxes were responsible only for 4 percent of total
tax revenue in that year.
Since 1988, however, this picture has changed
remarkably in the Netherlands (Vermeend and
Van der Vaart 1997; Heineken 2003). First, the FT
became gradually more important as a revenue-
raising instrument. This tax replaced a set of small
charges with a rather complicated tax base (includ-
ing air pollution and noise) for financing purposes.
After these charges were transformed into a trans-
parent tax on fuels in 1988, their rates were raised
substantially at the beginning of the 1990s. Second,
the Dutch government introduced a completely
new tax in 1996 to regulate energy consumption
and to reduce CO2 emissions. This tax, the regula-
tory energy tax (RET), was introduced despite the
failure of the European Commission to introduce
an EU-wide carbon tax in 1995 (see COM(95)
172). All energy taxes together accounted for
almost 9 percent of total tax revenue in 2002 and
the role of the MOE declined from almost 100 per-
cent of overall energy tax revenue in 1988 to only
66 percent in 2002 (see Table 1).Both the major tax
reform in the Netherlands in 2001 and recent tax
initiatives of the Dutch government continued to
reinforce this trend.
The shift in the tax treatment of energy products
underlying the rise in revenue is further illustrated
in Table 1. The table not only reveals large differ-
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ences in the current treatment of energy products
resulting from the different energy taxes, but also
shows how the newly introduced taxes, in particu-
lar the FT and the RET, broadened the tax base
and how they together relate to the minimum tax
rates set by the EU Directive. These taxes are
responsible for the inclusion of energy products
such as coal,natural gas and (small-scale consump-
tion of) electricity as well as mineral oils used for
heating purposes. In particular, the RET is respon-
sible for from over 50 to 100 percent of the excise
burden of some products. Note also that large dif-
ferences exist between tax rates on energy prod-
ucts used as motor fuels, heating fuel, feedstock or
for other applications. In general, MOE tax rates
are highest for gasoline and lowest for mineral oils
used for heating purposes. All excises are specific
per unit of energy volume.The FT has had a hybrid
tax base since 1990. Initially, a fixed CO2 compo-
nent was added to the initial tax base by energy
content. Since 1992, the different fuels have been
(more or less) taxed according to their relative
energy and carbon content,each counting for 50 per-
cent of the overall tax base.
The RET started as a tax on energy products used
for heating purposes (mainly gas in the Nether-
lands) or power generation (electricity) by small-
scale consumers, such as households and small
firms. Since the RET’s introduction in 1996 its tax
base has been broadened and now also includes
consumption by intermediate firms. Tax rates are
regressive with the level of consumption for each
connection to the grid, and very large electricity
consumption levels faced a zero rate in 2002. Re-
cently the electricity tax base was brought further
Table 1
Total excise rates onspecific energy products in the Netherlands in 2002












Mineral oils: motor fuels
– Leaded gasoline Liter 685
a) 12 698 421
– Unleadedgasoline Liter 615
a) 12 627 359
– Diesel/light fuel oil – low S
b) Liter 332
a) 14 345 302
– Diesel/light fuel oil Liter 346
a) 14 359 302
– LPG Kg 104 16 120 125
Mineral oils: other use
– Diesel Liter 53
a) 14 131 197 21
– Light fuel oil Liter 53
a) 14 132 198 21
– Heavy fueloil Kg 16 16 32 15
–L P G K g 1 6 156 172 0
Coal




– Coal andrefinery gas GJ 117
 d) 117 n.a.
– Coal gasificationgas GJ 462 462 n.a.
Natural gas
– Gas (0–5,000) m
3 11 124 135 4.75/9.5
e)
– Gas (5,000–170,000) m
3 11 58 69 4.75/9.5
e)
– Gas (170,000–1mn) m
3 11 11 21 4.75/9.5
e)
– Gas (1mn–10mn) m
3 11 11 4.75/9.5
e)
– Gas (> 10mn) m
3 7 7 4.75/9.5
e)
Electricity
– Electricity (0–10,000) KWh 60 60 0.5/1
e)
– Electricity (10,000–50,000) KWh 20 20 0.5/1
e)
– Electricity (50,000–10mn) KWh 6 60 . 5 / 1
e)
– Electricity (> 10mn) KWh 0.5/1
e)
Energy tax revenue million Euro 5.8 0.6 2.4 8.8
Percentage energy tax revenue % 66 7 27 100
a)Includes strategic storage tax of EUR 6 per unit. –
b) Sulfur content below 50 ppm. –
c)Taxpayer may opt for GJ
and carboncontent as a tax base, with a rate of EUR 0.198 per GJ or EUR 2.4493 per 1,000kg CO2.–
d) If traded;
the rate is zero if these gases are produced andused in the same plant. –
e) Low (high) tax rate applies to (non)com-
mercialuse .
Source: Statistics Netherlands; Dutch Ministry of Finance; COM (03) 96.in line with the requirements of the EU Directive
and now also applies to large scale energy con-
sumers (although with some allowed exemptions).
In fact, both the FT and RET were brought into
one legal framework – called the Energy Tax – at
the beginning of 2004.
Together, the FT and RET created the incentive
structure on energy products used for heating or
power generation. Note, first of all, that mineral
oils not used as motor fuels are subject to all the
taxes. The much lower MOE on mineral oils used
as heating fuel is compensated partly by the RET.
Crude oil is only taxed indirectly, i.e. downstream
after the refinery process,by the taxation of refined
mineral oils (gasoline, etc.). Accordingly, the ener-
gy consumed (and emissions caused) by refining is
excluded from the tax base, as are particular refin-
ery products, such as petrocokes and liquid and
gaseous residuals, which are often recycled in the
same plant.
The Netherlands is one of the few countries that
taxed but did not subsidize coal, although at a low
rate (coal mines were closed at the end of the
1960s). Special provisions exist for typical energy
products produced and recycled in production
processes based on coal, such as steel production.
For instance, there are exemptions for blast-fur-
nace and coke-oven gas, if recycled within a partic-
ular (large) plant. Only if these products are trad-
ed does the tax apply. Note also that the EU
Directive does not apply to these products either.
Consumption of natural gas (NG) is taxed through
the FT, although the tax rate for large-scale con-
sumption is very low.The regressive tax rates of the
RET,however,are much stronger,with even no tax
applying to large-scale NG consumption. Also, an
exemption existed for consumption up to 800m3
between 1996 and 2001, but this has recently been
changed into a tax credit with equal value in terms
of income loss (Euro 142). Finally, reduced tax rates
apply to gas consumed for horticulture.
The consumption of electricity is,like the consump-
tion of NG, taxed through the RET, including also
a regressive rate structure and an exemption for
very large consumers. Note that NG input for elec-
tricity production is exempted from the RET, and
all inputs have been exempted from the FT since
2001. Originally electricity producers also had to
pay FT for the use of fuels, such as coal and NG,
and a uranium tax was due for nuclear power gen-
eration between 1997 and 2001. In 2001, this
regime was changed in favor of what is called an
‘output’ tax. Now, all fuels used for electricity gen-
eration are exempted, including the fuels used in
combined heat and power (CHP) plants (with elec-
tric efficiency over 30 percent).Simultaneously,the
tax rates on electricity were raised under the RET
regime.
Note,finally,that several energy products were orig-
inally exempted from these energy taxes, like con-
sumption and production of electricity from bio-
mass, wind and solar power. However, these prod-
ucts have been taxed at a reduced rate since 2003.
Characterising the Dutch energy tax structure
Tax policy design of an energy tax to lower the lev-
els of CO2 emissions is rather straightforward in a
world of only one distortion, i.e. a competitive
economy with a negative externality from climate
change which is directly linked to CO2 emissions.
In this case a corrective Pigovian tax would correct
this externality simply by using the carbon content
of energy products, by allowing for exemptions of
energy products that are free of carbon content, by
including tax rebates for carbon abatement, and by
setting the tax rate equal to the level of the
(expected) environmental damage involved (see
Cnossen and Vollebergh 1992). In practice, howev-
er, governments refrain from the implications of
such a tax for various reasons. One important rea-
son is that they may also have a keen interest in the
revenues of such a tax. Even an optimal corrective
tax raises revenue in the optimum and this revenue
is never redistributed lump-sum in practice as is
assumed in a Pigovian world. For instance, govern-
ments may like to signal that they care about green
tax reform,and one measure to illustrate this signal
is, paradoxically, a higher share of green tax rev-
enue. However, a high share of tax revenue from
an energy tax base might also reflect a highly inef-
ficient tax from the Pigovian perspective if this tax
is not designed properly.1
The choice and development of the energy tax
structure of both the FT and the RET in the
Netherlands reveals this interesting paradox.
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Whereas the FT was designed for revenue-raising
reasons, its tax rate is rather low and its tax base is
remarkably broad including (relatively) elastic fuel
consumption from (very) large consumers of coal
and natural gas.The newly introduced RET with its
regulatory focus, however, raises much more tax
revenue than the FT applying much higher tax
rates on a (relatively) less elastic tax base, i.e. con-
sumption of energy for heating by households! I
summarize the main characteristics of both the FT
and the RET in 2002 as a point of reference in
Table 2.
A first observation is that the FT, not the RET, is
mainly responsible for the remarkable comprehen-
siveness of the Dutch energy tax base from a cli-
mate change perspective (see also Table 1).The FT
taxes coal and NG upstream (if produced or used
as ‘raw’ fuel or if distributed to others for domestic
use) and oil through a tax on refined oil products.
In contrast, the RET mainly focuses on down-
stream consumption of the major energy products
consumed at the household and small-firm level in
the Netherlands, i.e. NG and electricity. Only the
direct taxation of electricity has been added to the
energy tax base by the RET, while NG is now also
being taxed at the household level.
Second, as far as linkage between energy use and
emissions is concerned,which is the main issue from
a regulatory perspective (see Smulders and
Vollebergh 2001), the paradox is even more clear.
First of all, upstream taxation of energy products is
considered particularly distortive from the revenue
perspective (Bovenberg and Goulder 2002), but
downstream taxation of energy products implicitly
exempts upstream emissions (Pearson and Smith
1992).Thus,the choice of tax base is precisely oppo-
site to the main purpose of both taxes.One wonders
why a specific excise,like the FT,was introduced for
revenue reasons because energy consumption is
already taxed through VAT.The explanation for this
‘anomaly’ is that the FT replaces a system of small
environmental charges.Therefore its tax base had to
be linked to ‘the environment’ (even though its rev-
enue no longer has to be used for environmental
expenditures). In contrast the RET has always been
regarded as a unilateral environmental tax which
should exempt exposed energy consumption, i.e.
upstream energy use by energy-intensive industries
and electricity producers (see also Bovenberg
1993). Interestingly, the original (as well as current)
design for a European carbon tax was hardly differ-
ent in this respect (Ekins and Speck 1999).
Third, the exemptions as related to specific charac-
teristics of production processes, like steel produc-
tion and refineries, provide further evidence for the
paradox mentioned above. The heterogeneity of
energy use involved here, in particular due to com-
plex joint production,justifies special treatment (e.g.
Poterba and Rotemberg 1995). Much of the current
rationale of the Dutch energy tax structure follows
from a sometimes even accidental recognition of this
heterogeneity. For instance, the current FT does
exempt residual gases, which is clearly optimal from
the regulatory perspective. The
taxation of residuals favors sub-
stitution towards untaxed ele-
ments in the steel making or
refinery process, in particular
towards flaring. Although taxa-
tion of residual fuels would cer-
tainly be favorable from a rev-
enue-raising perspective, it is
very likely to result in more,
instead of less CO2-emissions.
The current exemption of resid-
ual fuel use clearly benefits the
environment, but its existence is
only due to a ruling of the Dutch
Supreme Court on completely
different grounds.2
Table 2
Comparison of fuel tax and regulatory energy tax in the Netherlands in 2002
Fuel Tax (FT) Regulatory Energy Tax
(RET)
Mainpurpose – Revenue raising – Regulation (climate
change emissions)











–R e s i d u a l e n e r g y
products





Abatement incentives –N o
– Carbon sequestration
– Subsidies for non-
fossil-fuel products
Tax rate structure – Specific (hybrid) – Specific (hybrid)
Level –L o w
– High, but decreasing
with higher levels of 
consumption
Source: author.
2 See Vollebergh (2004), for an extensive
discussion of the justification of this
exemption.The recent tax reform with respect to electricity is
another example of the paradox that the revenue-
raising FT serves regulatory incentives better than its
explicit regulatory alternative. Electricity is taxed
directly under a so called ‘output-based’ RET regime,
which exempts carbon emissions during electricity
production. Until 2001, however, the FT also applied
to the main inputs for electricity production in the
Netherlands – NG and coal. Since 2001, the energy
products used for electricity production, including
CHP installations, have been exempted from the FT
in favor of higher rates of the output-based RET.
Accordingly, input substitution by electricity produc-
ers to reduce CO2 emissions is no longer directly
addressed by the energy excise structure now.
The main reason behind this remarkable tax shift is a
compensation for CO2 abatement measures as prom-
ised by electricity producers according to the so-called
‘coal covenant’. Moreover, the measure sustains the
promotion of (NG-based) CHP generation in the
Netherlands.After the termination of a generous sub-
sidy to any (potential) producer of CHP several years
ago, the booming CHP business came to a sudden
standstill and even existing installations were threat-
ened.3 Broadening the NG tax base to include firms of
medium size under the RET would impose a further
disincentive to CHP. Shifting the tax burden from the
FT to a tax on ‘output’, i.e. the RET on electricity,
would lower the tax burden on the generation of elec-
tricity. Because the different modes of power genera-
tion are treated similarly under this reform, large-
scale power plants no longer face input and abate-
ment incentives to reduce climate change emissions.
Finally, carbon abatement incentives are particular-
ly small for both taxes. Even the incentives that
applied in 2002 have recently been reconsidered
and will be abolished.Apart from stimulating CHP
generation, the FT has no provisions for ‘carbon’
rebates, which is in line with the revenue-raising
purpose of the tax.Their absence in the RET, how-
ever, is remarkable.Also proposals to favor carbon
sequestration through afforestation by providing
offsets in the RET have never been put into prac-
tice.4 Yet the RET used to have incentives for 
nonfossil-fuel-based energy production, but now
even taxes renewable resources, though at a re-
duced rate.
As far as the tax rates are concerned,both taxes are
specific with a hybrid structure, while FT rates are
much lower than RET rates.With its upstream ori-
entation, the FT also taxes energy-intensive con-
sumers but only at low rates, while the RET taxes
mainly the consumption by small firms and house-
holds of NG and electricity, the main energy prod-
ucts consumed by these agents, at high rates. Even
though all agents are due to pay RET over their
inframarginal consumption of energy, energy-
intensive industries face no tax at the margin at all.
Again, tax rates on the different energy products
hardly follow the logic as implied by the purpose of
both taxes. The much lower tax burden for energy
products consumed by industry reflects the
Ramsey perspective.5 In general, (energy-inten-
sive) industry is more sensitive to the energy tax
base, and distortions are more likely for intermedi-
ate inputs, such as heavy fuel oil, coal, (large-scale
consumption of) NG and electricity. Thus to tax
energy substitutes for households and small firms
at a much higher level through the RET primarily
makes sense from a revenue perspective (ceteris
paribus). Again the Pigovian element is exactly
opposite to what one would expect.The FT clearly
favors NG over oil and coal for the relevant substi-
tutes at the industry level (for details see
Vollebergh 2004). Coal faces a total tax burden
almost twice as high as the tax burden on NG
which closely follows the Pigovian logic of indirect
taxation according to the (relative) pollution inten-
sity of these products.In contrast,the relative (nor-
malized) total tax burden of heating products for
households and small firms, such as NG, light fuel
oil and electricity, is similar. Clearly, this burden,
which is mainly caused by the RET, appears not to
follow the Pigovian logic.
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3 CHP was subsidized in the Netherlands through a fixed price per
kWh delivered to the national grid. This price was considerably
above the market price for electricity and therefore stimulated a
fast expansion of CHP in the Netherlands. Note that CHP is still
subsidized by a reduction of the RET on electricity produced from
these plants (not larger than 200 GWh).
4 Firms distributing NG and electricity would have received tax
rebates for certified afforestation (under the Carbon Offset
Verification System), but not for other carbon abatement invest-
ments.
5 A more appropriate comparison requires standardization of tax
rates in relation to energy and/or carbon content of the fuels, how-
ever. The problem with the (common) representation of the ener-
gy tax structure (like Table 1) is its poor informative content with
respect to its (regulatory) incentives.The volume of fuels is a poor
indicator of the relative performance of energy products for heat-
ing purposes. Although an increase in the tax rate per unit of vol-
ume always induces agents to look for cheaper alternatives, the
impact of a similar rise in tax differs across products due to differ-
ences in, for instance, heating potential. Using several tax ratios
that account for this standardization,Vollebergh (2004) provides a
much more detailed description and analysis of the energy tax
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Some tax policy lessons
What can we learn from the Dutch experience with
energy taxation? The most challenging lessons are:
• Higher tax revenues from an environmental tax
base, like ‘energy’ or even ‘fossil fuels’ need not
signal optimal green tax reform. Higher tax rev-
enues on some energy inputs may even exacer-
bate emissions (residual fuels), whereas alterna-
tive tax bases may raise revenue at lower (dis-
tortionary) costs (e.g. broad based consumption
tax, like VAT). Indeed, the newly introduced
regulatory energy tax (RET) in 1996 signals
green tax reform because of its high amount of
revenue raised on a ‘green’ tax base, i.e. energy
use by households and small firms. However,
although the RET might be (relatively) efficient
from a Ramsey perspective, a simple increase in
the tax rates of the existing tax on fuels would
probably have been much better from a regula-
tory perspective. Thus the revenue-raising tax
on energy accommodates important exemptions
from the regulatory perspective, whereas the
regulatory tax mainly taxes relatively inelastic
uses of (fossil-fuel) energy. This just illustrates
that higher tax revenues from energy tax bases
do not always signal Pareto improvements, even
if one restricts the evaluation to the environ-
mental dividend alone.
• In line with the previous remark, an uniform
corrective taxation is not always the best solu-
tion to ‘repair’ an externality. Specific sectors or
production processes might be optimally
exempted from indirect environmental taxes,
for instance if emissions and inputs are substi-
tutes, or if administrative cost are prohibitive
(relative to the abatement potential). Although
the fundamental idea that more direct instru-
ments are beneficial to society still remains
valid, these benefits should be weighed against
efficiency losses due to other second-best ele-
ments,such as heterogeneity in informational or
abatement costs. A clear example is the choice
of the EU not to tax residuals recycled in
refineries and steel making plants.
• The Dutch energy tax as well as the EU
Directive for a coordinated EU-wide energy tax
account for comprehensive taxation of energy
products. All upstream and downstream fossil-
fuel products, except crude oil, are subject to
some tax. However, the energy tax structure in
terms of the composition of the tax base, its
choice of the tax base (energy-content), options
for tax rebates for carbon abatement and its
rate structure leaves room for improvement.
Upstream taxes with their strong linkage, the
limited (cheap) options for direct emission
abatement and their low transaction costs seem
to provide an interesting alternative for the rel-
atively high energy tax burden for households.
Even low tax rates would already trigger large
energy-intensive firms to invest in carbon abate-
ment options, in particular if a tax would allow
for (self-enforcing) tax rebates, whereas such
options do not exist at the household level.
Higher ‘output’ tax rates on refined oil and elec-
tricity never compensate for the loss of abate-
ment potential from these plants, in particular
because they are usually large and energy-inten-
sive. Other ways to improve the effectiveness of
the existing taxes would be to introduce at least
a hybrid carbon tax base, allow for tax rebates
for abatement and to relate the tax rates even
more explicitly to product characteristics.
• Finally, the recent EU Directive is a useful step
forward and provides interesting opportunities
to exploit international coordination to avoid at
least some of the drawbacks mentioned before
provided that the focus is on regulation, not on
revenue raising energy taxes. For instance, the
recent shift from an input to an output electric-
ity tax in the Netherlands could be reconsidered
if all countries would commit to at least taxing
their electricity production energy inputs at
some minimum rate.However,the many exemp-
tions allowed in the current Directive render
this rather unlikely, which makes Member
States reluctant to implement this type of ener-
gy tax. Also the lower tax rates for commercial
use do not fully exploit the regulatory potential
of a European wide energy tax. It would be
much more efficient to apply (at least) similar
tax rates to commercial rates together with
proper carbon abatement rebates. Indeed, these
as well as other examples demonstrate that the
opportunities for regulation are not fully
exploited yet. If there is a reason for the taxa-
tion of energy it is regulation, since an energy
tax base does not seem to be the best choice as
a revenue raising source.
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